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1 
EVERYBODY’S GOING SURFING: THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT APPROVES THE WARRANTLESS USE 
OF INTERNET TRACKING DEVICES IN 
UNITED STATES v. STANLEY 
Abstract: On June 11, 2014, in United States v. Stanley, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit held that the warrantless use of a tracking device to 
detect the location of a wireless signal was not a search in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that because the defendant was using 
his neighbor’s open wireless network, the defendant did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The court’s reasoning was based on a belief that the use 
of an open wireless network, which is not password protected, is “likely illegal.” 
This comment argues that the Third Circuit erred in refusing to recognize the 
applicability of the test for “sense-enhancing devices” derived from the 2001 
U.S. Supreme Court decision Kyllo v. United States. Further, the Third Circuit’s 
holding imperils an activity that many law-abiding citizens engage in daily. 
INTRODUCTION 
The rapid pace of technological innovation presents a constant challenge 
for law enforcement, legislatures, and the legal system to keep pace with 
criminal use of technology.1 Determined individuals continue to find creative 
new ways to use technology to engage in criminal activity, while equally de-
termined law enforcement officials seek to thwart them.2 Legislators and 
courts are left to face these innovations as they arise, often without fully un-
derstanding the consequences to the general public.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Matthew Bierlein, Policing the Wireless World: Access Liability in the Open Wi-Fi 
Era, 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 1123, 1125 (2006) (reflecting on the difficulty of applying the law to new 
technologies while keeping in mind potential ramifications); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-
Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 487–88 (2011) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court’s application of the Fourth Amendment evolves as technology changes); 
Amy E. Wells, Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides with the Problem of Child 
Pornography and the Internet, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 99 (2000) (arguing that the Internet has made 
such rapid advances that the law can no longer keep pace). 
 2 See Kerr, supra note 1, at 486 (noting that as criminals find new ways to commit crimes, 
police likewise make use of new methods to solve those crimes). See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING THE INTERNET AND 
COMPUTER NETWORKS (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210798.pdf, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/CCA9-EVBX (identifying various methods of using technology to detect 
computer and online criminal activity). 
 3 See Anne Meredith Fulton, Cyberspace and the Internet: Who Will Be the Privacy Police?, 
3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 63, 70 (1995) (stating that legislators cannot fashion adequate laws 
2 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
In June 2014, in United States v. Stanley, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit faced a question regarding the legality of tracking technolo-
gy used by the Pennsylvania State Police.4 Law enforcement used this tech-
nology to locate the defendant, Richard Stanley, who was suspected of trans-
mitting child pornography by “mooching” off of his neighbor’s unprotected 
wireless Internet signal.5 The technology traced the source of the defendant’s 
wireless signal using an antenna and software called “Moocherhunter™.”6 
The Third Circuit held that use of this technology by the police, which locat-
ed Stanley while he was using his computer within his home, was not an un-
lawful search.7 The Third Circuit, therefore, affirmed the lower court’s ruling 
that a warrant was not required to use the technology.8 
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit should have applied the test 
for sense-enhancing devices and should not have applied the expectation of 
privacy test to reach its holding.9 Part I of this Comment reviews the current 
state of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in regard to unreasonable searches 
and discusses the facts and procedural posture of Stanley in the district 
court.10 Part II explores the reasoning behind the Third Circuit’s holding that 
Stanley did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using the un-
protected wireless signal emanating from his neighbor’s wireless router.11 In 
                                                                                                                           
until they understand the technology they are regulating); Eli R. Shindelman, Time for the Court 
to Become “Intimate” with Surveillance Technology, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1909, 1911 (2011) (arguing 
that surveillance technology has advanced faster than Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 4 See United States v. Stanley (Stanley II), 753 F.3d 114, 115–16 (3d Cir. 2014) (describing 
the technology), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 507 (2014). 
 5 See id. at 116–17. 
 6 Id. at 116. Mirroring the Third Circuit’s opinion, future references to Moocherhunter en-
compass the software as well as the computer and directional antenna that are used with the soft-
ware. See id. at 116 n.5. 
 7 See id. at 115. 
 8 See id. Other circuits have not yet ruled on whether a warrant is required before using simi-
lar technology to locate individuals suspected of computer and/or Internet crimes. See Response 
Brief for the United States at 41, Stanley II, 753 F.3d 114 (No. 13-1910), 2013 WL 5427843, at 
*41. District courts have applied the third party doctrine from Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979), to the same or similar technology. See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 122. In 2013, in United 
States v. Norris, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California cited the lower 
court’s opinion in Stanley and found that use of the same technology, Moocherhunter, to locate the 
defendant did not require a warrant. See No. 2:11–cr–00188–KJM, 2013 WL 4737197, at *8 (E.D. 
Cal. Sept. 3, 2013). The court reached that decision by applying the third party doctrine. See id. In 
2012, in United States v. Broadhurst, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon found that 
evidence obtained after police used similar technology to locate defendant and obtain a search 
warrant was not admissible because police trespassed on defendant’s property in order to use the 
technology. See No. 3:11–cr–00121–MO–1, 2012 WL 5985615, at *6 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012). 
Apart from police error, the court applied the third party doctrine and found that use of the tech-
nology would not have required a warrant. See id. at *4. 
 9 See infra notes 75–111 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 13–57 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 58–74 and accompanying text. 
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closing, Part III argues that the Third Circuit’s holding misapplies U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent and exposes law-abiding Internet users to an unrea-
sonably limited protection of their Fourth Amendment rights.12 
I. (UN)REASONABLE SEARCHES: EXTENDING PROTECTION  
FROM THE HOME TO THE INDIVIDUAL 
In response to the exponential growth in technological innovation that 
began in the mid-twentieth century, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has 
shifted from its singular focus on a property-based conception of protecting 
the home.13 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the Fourth Amendment’s 
applicability to an individual’s privacy interests outside of the home.14 Sec-
tion A reviews the property-based focus of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
and discusses the shift towards protecting privacy outside of the home.15 Sec-
tion B discusses the Supreme Court’s recent insistence that privacy protec-
tions have not usurped the essential Fourth Amendment protection of the 
home.16 Section C reviews the facts and procedural posture of Stanley.17 
A. Fourth Amendment Protection Begins at Home 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence traditionally emphasized the sanctity 
of the home.18 The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement from con-
ducting unreasonable searches of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”19 
Generally, a search requires a court-issued warrant that identifies probable 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 75–111 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling precedent that required a 
physical trespass to invoke Fourth Amendment protection against a search); Gerald G. Ashdown, 
The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 
1294 (1981) (noting the Katz court’s shift from focusing on property rights when applying the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 14 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that recording defendant’s conversation from the exteri-
or of a telephone booth was a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy). 
 15 See infra notes 18–32 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 33–39 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 40–57 and accompanying text. 
 18 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the 
very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
630 (1886) (noting the Fourth Amendment’s protection of an individual’s personal property and 
security). 
 19 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Fourth Amendment protections also apply to state actors 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that 
the exclusion of evidence obtained without a warrant in federal courts extends to state courts by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
4 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
cause and specifies the location of the proposed search.20 Because the Fourth 
Amendment provides protection against unreasonable searches, reasonable 
searches do not require a warrant.21 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence simul-
taneously protects individuals from unreasonable government intrusion and 
seeks to incentivize state and federal law enforcement to work within the 
boundaries of the law.22 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that evi-
dence obtained in an unlawful search cannot be used to establish a criminal 
defendant’s guilt.23 
Until the late 1960s, the Fourth Amendment was limited to protection 
against physical trespass of the home or property.24 In 1967, in United States 
v. Katz, the U.S. Supreme Court—recognizing the increasing threat to privacy 
from advancing technology—extended the scope of Fourth Amendment pro-
tections to privacy interests outside of the home.25 This change was initiated 
when the Supreme Court held that unlawful searches are not limited to physi-
cal intrusions.26 In short, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
protects “people, not places.”27  
                                                                                                                           
 20 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, support-
ed by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”). 
 21 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (holding that the search of a home with-
out a warrant was reasonable because police were in pursuit of an armed robber known to have 
entered the premises); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950) (holding that the 
Framers reserved the government’s power to conduct reasonable searches without a warrant); 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 149, 162 (1925) (holding that police had probable 
cause for suspicion of illegal activity by defendant so that evidence obtained from defendant’s car 
without a warrant was admissible). 
 22 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 647–48 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)) 
(stating that the well-intentioned efforts of police to gather evidence against guilty parties cannot 
be pursued outside the scope of individuals’ constitutional rights); McDonald v. United States, 
335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948) (emphasizing the necessity of interposing a neutral judge between 
police and their ability to search a home); Ashdown, supra note 13, at 1289 (arguing that law 
enforcement is unlikely to regulate itself by sacrificing crime prevention in order to protect indi-
vidual rights). 
 23 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644–45, 655 (holding that evidence obtained after police forcibly 
entered defendant’s home without a warrant was inadmissible). 
 24 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (focusing Fourth Amendment protection on privacy rather than 
just property); Derek T. Conom, Sense-Enhancing Technology and the Search in the Wake of 
Kyllo v. United States: Will Prevalence Kill Privacy?, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 749, 756 (2005) 
(noting the Katz Court’s shift from protecting property rights to privacy interests when applying 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 25 See 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not limited to physical intru-
sions of the home); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509 (noting that in future cases the Court may be re-
quired to consider “the Fourth Amendment implications of . . . frightening paraphernalia which 
the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society”); Shindelman, supra note 
3, at 1914 (stating that the decision in Katz expanded the scope of Fourth Amendment protection 
by including privacy). 
 26 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. In Katz, FBI agents recorded the defendant’s conversations by 
placing a recording device on the exterior of a telephone booth. Id. at 348. The Supreme Court 
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The Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for privacy interests that 
courts use today: whether (1) a defendant has a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy; and (2) society would recognize the defendant’s expectation of privacy 
as reasonable.28 The Fourth Amendment provides protection against a war-
rantless search when both conditions are met.29 
An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy was subsequently di-
minished through the holdings in a series of cases that developed the “third 
party doctrine.”30 For example, the Court held that because numbers dialed 
from a defendant’s home telephone were voluntarily transmitted to the tele-
phone company, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.31 By transmitting these numbers to a third party—a telephone compa-
ny—customers “assume the risk” of having those numbers shared with oth-
ers, such as law enforcement.32 
                                                                                                                           
held that although the recording device was not placed within the telephone booth, the defendant 
had entered the booth with the expectation that his conversation would be private. See id. at 352–
53. 
 27 See id. at 351. 
 28 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (restating the expectation of privacy test in the form 
courts use today); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (referring to “the 
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test”). 
 29 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 30 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 567–70 
(2009) (tracing the development of the third party doctrine through case law). The U.S. Supreme 
Court first developed the doctrine in 1952, in On Lee v. United States, when the Court held that 
there was no Fourth Amendment violation when the government recorded a conversation where 
one party to the conversation had consented to wearing a wire. See 343 U.S. 747, 753–54 (1952). 
In 1976, in United States v. Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court held that police did not need a warrant 
to subpoena the defendant’s bank records. See 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that there is no 
Fourth Amendment violation when the government obtains documents from a third party even 
when a defendant believes the third party will keep the information in confidence). By 1979, the 
Court had fully formulated the third party doctrine in Smith v. Maryland, holding that police did 
not need a warrant to ask a telephone company to record a list of telephone numbers dialed by the 
defendant. See 442 U.S. at 745–46; Kerr, supra, at 570. 
 31 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743. In Smith, police asked a telephone company to utilize a pen 
register to remotely track and share with police the numbers dialed from the defendant’s home 
telephone. Id. at 737. Although the content of telephone conversations are protected from being 
recorded without a warrant, the Court noted that telephone companies openly disclose their ability 
to record the numbers each customer dials. See id. at 741–42. The Court provided two examples of 
this disclosure: (1) customers’ monthly bills included a list of calls made to long-distance num-
bers; and (2) phone books distributed by telephone companies included a notice to customers, 
which offered to help authorities trace unwanted (harassing) phone calls. See id. at 742–43. 
 32 See id. at 744. Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that to find an assumption of the risk 
requires an element of choice that is absent given the necessity of telephones in everyday life. See 
id. at 749–50 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Marshall challenged the majority’s conten-
tion that the average consumer has notice of a telephone company’s ability to trace phone num-
bers. See id. at 749. He argued that even if such notice was present, most consumers would not 
then make the leap to understand that a telephone company can share those numbers with police. 
See id. at 743. The 1986 Pen Register statute circumscribed the holding in Smith by requiring a 
warrant to track phone numbers dialed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2012). It was amended under the 
6 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
B. No Place Like Home: Privacy Within the Home Is Not Diminished by 
Protections Without 
The Supreme Court has been careful to ensure that new interpretations 
of the Fourth Amendment’s applicability outside the home do not diminish or 
replace the fundamental right to protection against government intrusion 
within the home.33 The Court has reinforced that precept by addressing the 
potential of technology to procure information about the interior of the home 
without a physical intrusion.34 To that end, the Court has interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment to protect against non-physical searches of the home.35 
For example, in 2001, in Kyllo v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the use of an infrared thermal sensor to detect heat being emitted 
from the defendant’s home was an unreasonable search that required a war-
rant.36 The sensor was capable of detecting both legal and illegal activity 
within the home, leading the Court to hold that all activity within the home, 
no matter how trivial, should be protected from government intrusion absent 
a warrant.37 Consequently, the Court held that the use of “sense-enhancing 
                                                                                                                           
Patriot Act in 2001 to require a warrant to obtain Internet routing and addressing data. See Patriot 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216(a), 115 Stat. 272, 288 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3121 (2012)). Some scholars defend the controversial third party doctrine, arguing that it closes 
a loophole that would allow criminals to escape detection by communicating through third parties. 
See Kerr, supra note 30, at 564 (arguing that the third party doctrine is necessary to keep criminals 
from abusing Fourth Amendment protection by using third parties to circumvent law enforce-
ment). But see Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided 
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005) (arguing that the third party 
doctrine poses a threat to personal privacy by creating the potential for unfettered government 
surveillance). 
 33 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (noting that the Fourth Amendment 
primarily protects the home); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (stating that privacy protections supplement 
rather than replace traditional Fourth Amendment protections); Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 
64 (1992) (stating that the shift in focus to privacy protection has not “snuffed out” protection of 
the home); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969) (denying that Katz removed 
Fourth Amendment protection of the home). 
 34 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of a device to gain 
information about the interior of a home, even absent a physical intrusion into the home, was a 
search). 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. at 34–35. Police suspected that the defendant was growing marijuana in his garage 
with the use of special lamps that produce higher than average temperatures. See id. at 29. Police 
officers used a thermal sensor from within their car, which was located across the street from the 
defendant’s home. Id. at 30. 
 37 See id. at 37 (stating that Fourth Amendment protection does not depend on the quality or 
quantity of information obtained during a search). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued 
that a warrant was not required because the defendant was knowingly emitting heat from his home 
and simple observation may have provided police with the same information. See id. at 42 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). As an example, Justice Stevens suggested that snow melting from the roof of 
the garage at a faster rate than that of neighboring roofs would have provided the same insight into 
the temperature of the defendant’s garage. See id. at 43. 
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technology” that is not in use by the public and is able to gather information 
about activity within the home that, absent the technology, could not be gath-
ered without entering the home, constitutes a search of the home within the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment.38 When a device combines these character-
istics, law enforcement is required to obtain a warrant before using the device 
to conduct a search.39 
C. United States v. Stanley in the District Court 
In November 2010, the routine investigations of the Pennsylvania State 
Police led to the discovery of a computer sharing child pornography through 
a peer-to-peer file-sharing network.40 After tracing the activity to Stanley’s 
neighbor’s router, law enforcement obtained a search warrant and performed 
a search of the neighbor’s home.41 Law enforcement found two computers in 
the neighbor’s home, though neither contained the files in question.42 Law 
enforcement also found a wireless router in the home.43 Stanley’s neighbor 
had not password-protected his router, leading law enforcement to infer that a 
third computer within range of the router had accessed it from outside the 
neighbor’s home.44 Law enforcement located the third computer and the like-
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. at 34, 40 (majority opinion); see April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The 
Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the 
Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 693 (2005) (discussing the Kyllo Court’s development 
of this new test). 
 39 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 40; see Conom, supra note 24, at 765 (2005) (stating that few courts 
have used the Kyllo test because of the difficulty in applying the test to new technology). 
 40 See United States v. Stanley (Stanley I), No. 11–272, 2012 WL 5512987, at *2–3 (W.D. Pa. 
Nov. 14, 2012), aff’d, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014). Law enforcement discovered the file-sharing 
user’s public IP address and identified it as a Comcast IP address. Id. Police then obtained a court 
order to compel Comcast to share information regarding the name and address of the subscriber 
with that public IP address. Id. This led police to Stanley’s neighbor, the Comcast subscriber. Id. 
 41 See id. at *3. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id. Wireless routers assign unique IP addresses to each computer that accesses the In-
ternet through the router. Id. at *4. Upon inspection of the neighbor’s wireless router, law en-
forcement discovered that the router had assigned three unique IP addresses, yet the neighbor’s 
computers used only two of those numbers. See id. at *5. Law enforcement determined that their 
suspect must have been assigned the third unique IP address associated with the router. See id. 
 44 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 115–16. The neighbor confirmed that he had not given anyone 
explicit permission to access his router. See Stanley I, 2012 WL 5512987, at *3. Wireless routers 
typically transmit and receive radio signals from a radius of 300 feet. Reply Brief for Appellant at 
24, Stanley II, 753 F.3d 114 (No. 13-1910), 2013 WL 5869880, at *24. Law enforcement searched 
the settings on the wireless router and identified the MAC address of the computer (a unique num-
ber) associated with the third IP address, yet law enforcement was unable to locate the computer 
with this information alone. See Stanley I, 2012 WL 5512987, at *5–6; see also Broadhurst, 2012 
WL 5985615, at *6 (noting that the defendant’s wireless signal could have been transmitted to the 
router in question from anywhere, making use of tracking technology necessary to locate the de-
fendant). Law enforcement was, however, able to confirm that the third computer had accessed the 
file-sharing network. See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 117; Stanley I, 2012 WL 5512987, at *5–6. 
8 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
ly suspect by using tracking technology available to the Pennsylvania State 
Police—Moocherhunter.45 
Moocherhunter tracks the location of unauthorized wireless users, or 
“moochers,” by utilizing a directional antenna to trace a computer or device 
transmitting signals to and from a wireless router.46 Using Moocherhunter, 
law enforcement tracked the unauthorized user by following the signal the 
third computer was transmitting to and from the router.47 The signal was 
strongest when law enforcement stood on the sidewalk outside of Stanley’s 
apartment door.48 
 After identifying Stanley’s address, law enforcement was able to ob-
tain a search warrant.49 During the search of his apartment, Stanley confessed 
to using his neighbor’s wireless signal to access child pornography.50 Stanley 
was indicted on one count of possession of child pornography under 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).51 Stanley pled not guilty to the charge and filed a 
motion to suppress evidence gathered by police and statements he made dur-
ing the search.52 Stanley argued that law enforcement’s use of Moocherhunter 
to locate his laptop computer within his home constituted a search that re-
quired a warrant.53 On November 14, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania denied Stanley’s motion.54 Stanley then ap-
pealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the 
lower court’s decision on June 11, 2014.55 The Third Circuit held that Stanley 
did not have a “legitimate” expectation of privacy in transmitting child por-
nography through his neighbor’s wireless router.56 The U.S. Supreme Court 
denied Stanley’s petition for writ of certiorari on November 10, 2014.57 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Stanley I, 2012 WL 5512987, at *7–8. Pennsylvania State Police were unsure as to 
whether or not use of the software required a search warrant, and called the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for advice. See id. at *6. Based on that conversation, law enforcement decided a search warrant 
was unnecessary. See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 117. 
 46 Stanley I, 2012 WL 5512987, at *6. Pennsylvania State Police used Moocherhunter in 
“passive mode” in order to locate Stanley’s computer. Id. Moocherhunter can also be used in “ac-
tive mode” in order to trace any wireless signal transmitted to any wireless router. Id. 
 47 See id. at *7–8. Law enforcement entered the MAC address for the suspect’s computer into 
the police-owned laptop with Moocherhunter installed and attached a directional antenna to track 
the signal. See id. at *7. 
 48 See id. at *8. 
 49 See id. 
 50 Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 117. Law enforcement found 144 files containing images and videos 
of child pornography on Stanley’s laptop computer. Id. 
 51 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2012); Stanley I, 2012 WL 5512987, at *1. 
 52 Stanley I, 2012 WL 5512987, at *1. 
 53 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119. 
 54 Stanley I, 2012 WL 5512987, at *22. 
 55 Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 114–15. 
 56 See id. at 124. 
 57 See Stanley v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 507 (2014) (denying petition for writ of certiorari). 
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II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT SEEKS LEGITIMACY IN REASONABLE  
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s finding 
while clarifying the district court’s reasoning.58 The Third Circuit agreed that 
the expectation of privacy test was appropriate but rejected the district court’s 
application of the third party doctrine to the facts of the case.59 This Part re-
views the Third Circuit’s holding, beginning with its rejection of the third 
party doctrine.60 This Part then reviews the Third Circuit’s application of the 
expectation of privacy test.61 Lastly, this Part discusses why the Third Circuit 
rejected the test developed in Kyllo v. United States.62  
The Third Circuit rejected the lower court’s application of the third party 
doctrine.63 The district court found that because Stanley transmitted infor-
mation to his neighbor’s router, Stanley had assumed the risk of that infor-
mation being given to police.64 The Third Circuit held that this application of 
the third party doctrine was too broad, as all Internet traffic requires sharing 
information with third parties, such as servers.65 Because the information 
transmitted to these third parties includes much beyond the basic data of tele-
phone numbers dialed from a home telephone, the Third Circuit feared 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See United States v. Stanley (Stanley II), 753 F.3d 114, 124 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 507 (2014). 
 59 See id. at 122. 
 60 See infra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 62 See infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
 63 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 122; supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (discussing the 
third party doctrine). The Third Circuit’s holding is also counter to the lower court findings in 
United States v. Norris and United States v. Broadhurst. See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 122; United 
States v. Norris, No. 2:11–cr–00188–KJM, 2013 WL 4737197, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013) 
(holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet data transmit-
ted to a third party); United States v. Broadhurst, No. 3:11–cr–00121–MO–1, 2012 WL 5985615, 
at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012) (holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy because he transmitted information to a third party). 
 64 See United States v. Stanley (Stanley I), No. 11–272, 2012 WL 5512987, at *12 (W.D. Pa. 
Nov. 14, 2012), aff’d, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit corrected the technological 
leap made by the lower court regarding exactly what Stanley transmitted to a third party. See Stan-
ley II, 753 F.3d at 123–24. The lower court seemed to suggest that Stanley had transmitted his 
physical address to his neighbor’s router, which the neighbor was then able to give to police. See 
id. Instead, police were only able to obtain discrete data from the neighbor’s router—Stanley’s IP 
and MAC addresses—that police then input into Moocherhunter to locate Stanley. See id. 
 65 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 124; Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 585 (2011) (noting that third parties like Internet Service Providers and 
websites have access to a broad range of data transmitted by Internet users). 
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providing law enforcement with “unfettered access” to individuals’ Internet 
data without adequate Fourth Amendment protection.66 
After eliminating the third party doctrine from its analysis, the Third 
Circuit applied the expectation of privacy test and held that Stanley did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy because of the “dubious legality” of 
using his neighbor’s wireless signal.67 In so holding, the Third Circuit relied 
on a piece of analysis that the U.S. Supreme Court added to the expectation of 
privacy test.68 In 1978, in Rakas v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court added a 
requirement that a reasonable expectation of privacy must also be “legiti-
mate,” or lawful.69 Therefore, in addition to Stanley’s mode of access to the 
Internet, the Third Circuit held that given the illegality of Stanley’s transmis-
sion of child pornography, society would not recognize Stanley’s expectation 
of privacy as reasonable.70 
Finally, the Third Circuit held that the test set out in Kyllo was inade-
quate given Stanley’s use of a “virtual arm” to extend his activities outside of 
his home.71 The Third Circuit addressed the similarities between law en-
forcement’s use of Moocherhunter and law enforcement’s use of a thermal 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (holding that customers do not have an 
expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed from their home telephone); Stanley II, 753 
F.3d at 124 (indicating reluctance to apply the third party doctrine to all signals sent to third par-
ties). 
 67 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120–22 (reviewing case law to arrive at the conclusion that Stan-
ley lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy); supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the expectation of privacy test). Under the expectation of privacy test, in order to enjoy 
Fourth Amendment protection, an expectation of privacy must be both subjectively and objective-
ly reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The 
Third Circuit held that although Stanley may have had a subjective expectation of privacy, he did 
not have an objective expectation of privacy because of his “likely illegal” use of his neighbor’s 
router. See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120–22. 
 68 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120–22. This addition was explained in 1978, in Rakas v. Illi-
nois, when the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry is 
necessarily negated when society would view the activity in question as “wrongful.” 439 U.S. 128, 
143–44 n.12 (1978) (quoting United States v. Jones, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960)) (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
 69 439 U.S. at 143–44 n.12; see Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120–22. The Third Circuit, citing to a 
footnote in Rakas, compared Stanley’s expectation of privacy to a burglar’s unreasonable expecta-
tion of privacy while stealing items from an unoccupied summerhouse. Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120 
(citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44 n.12). The Court described Stanley as a “virtual trespasser” who 
had “hijacked” his neighbor’s wireless router. Id. The Third Circuit noted that Pennsylvania, like 
several other states, has statutes that might possibly apply to wireless mooching. See 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 3926 (“Theft of services”), 7611 (“Unlawful use of computer and other computer 
crimes”) (2014); Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120–21 nn.10–11. 
 70 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 121, 124. 
 71 See id. at 119–20; supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in 
Kyllo). In 2001, in Kyllo v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a warrant is required 
for devices that can sense activity within the home that would not be detectable without entering 
the home. See 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
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sensor to scan the interior temperature of a home in Kyllo.72 Although the 
Third Circuit acknowledged that Moocherhunter met the requirements of the 
Kyllo test for sense-enhancing devices, the court stated that Kyllo only applies 
to activities that are confined within the home.73 Because Stanley sent data 
outside of his home to his neighbor’s router, the Third Circuit held that his 
actions were removed from the “safe harbor” of Kyllo, defeating the objective 
prong of the expectation of privacy test.74 
III. KYLLO HAS THE HOME COURT ADVANTAGE 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit should not have reached 
the question of whether Stanley had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
transmitting data from his laptop using an open wireless network.75 Instead, 
the Third Circuit should have recognized that, similar to the device used in 
Kyllo v. United States, use of Moocherhunter to detect Stanley’s activity with-
in his home was an unreasonable search.76 Although the Third Circuit was 
laudable in limiting the potentially Orwellian reach of the third party doctrine 
into the realm of Internet data, the court otherwise overlooked essential facts 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119. 
 73 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119. Moocherhunter was held to be sense-
enhancing technology that is not in general use and can gather information about activity within 
the home that, absent use of the technology, could not be obtained without entering the home. See 
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119. 
 74 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120. The court acknowledged that Moocherhunter met the re-
quirements for sense-enhancing devices that require a warrant. See id. at 119. The Third Circuit 
distinguished the facts in Kyllo by stating that the defendant in Kyllo had confined his activities 
within the home. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119. The Third Circuit held that 
Kyllo did not apply because Stanley transmitted data outside of his home. See Stanley II, 753 F.3d 
at 119–20. In addition, in Kyllo, the Supreme Court was particularly concerned with the fact that 
the thermal sensor police used could detect any activity, legal or illegal, taking place within the 
home. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005) (“Critical to that decision [in Kyllo] was 
the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case, intimate details in a 
home, such as ‘at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.’” (citing 
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38) (emphasis added)); 533 U.S. at 38. The Third Circuit focused only on the 
possible illegality of Stanley’s actions. See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119–20. The Third Circuit de-
termined that Stanley lacked a “legitimate” expectation of privacy when engaging in the “likely 
illegal” activity of accessing an unprotected wireless signal. See id. 
 75 See United States v. Stanley (Stanley II), 753 F.3d 114, 119–24 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 507 (2014). Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied Stanley’s certiorari petition, the 
Court will need to clarify this area of the law soon given the uncertainty of the application of 
Fourth Amendment protections to this type of Internet use. See Stanley v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
507 (2014) (denying petition for certiorari); Bierlein, supra note 1, at 1125–26 (observing the 
ambiguity regarding the applicability of state and federal laws to open wireless networks). 
 76 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119–24. In 2001, 
in Kyllo, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a warrant is required for use of a sense-enhancing de-
vice that is not in general public use to detect activity within the home that otherwise could not be 
detected without entering the home. See 533 U.S. at 34. 
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and precedent in order to reach its holding.77 The remainder of this Part out-
lines the Third Circuit’s flawed reasoning.78 First, this Part argues that the 
Third Circuit misapplied U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding sense-
enhancing devices and the applicability of the expectation of privacy test to 
activity within the home.79 This Part then argues that courts should abandon 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test as applied to open wireless net-
works.80 Finally, this Part calls on Congress to clarify the legality of the eve-
ryday activity of open wireless Internet use.81 
As a threshold issue, the Third Circuit predicates its focus on Stanley’s 
lack of a legitimate expectation of privacy on a misapplication of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holding in Kyllo.82 The Third Circuit distinguished the facts 
in Stanley by arguing that, unlike the defendant in Kyllo, Stanley had not con-
fined his activities to his home.83 Yet in Kyllo, the Supreme Court focused on 
the fact that the device used was capable of detecting activity within the 
home, regardless of whether or not the defendant had exposed that activity to 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 124 (noting reluctance to provide the government with unfet-
tered access to personal metadata); infra notes 82–93 and accompanying text (discussing the Third 
Circuit’s decision to ignore Supreme Court precedent articulated in Kyllo). This is consistent with 
detractors of the third party doctrine who are increasingly concerned about the repercussions of 
the doctrine at a time when Internet users transmit and store large amounts of personal data 
through and with third parties. See Shindelman, supra note 3, at 1937 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court has allowed the government to achieve Orwellian capabilities through its Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 
1531 (2010) (asserting that application of the third party doctrine in the online context could ex-
pose massive amounts of data stored online); Tokson, supra note 65, at 585 (arguing that the doc-
trine is incompatible with the Internet age). Widespread government surveillance of private citi-
zens has come under fire in recent years, most recently through publicity surrounding the National 
Security Agency (NSA) leaks. See Jennifer Stisa Granick & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Crim-
inal N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/opinion/
the-criminal-nsa.html, archived at http://perma.cc/53AV-HE52?type=pdf (arguing that the NSA’s 
collection of massive amounts of metadata on private citizens was criminal). The Third Circuit 
was likely chastened by the resulting public outrage over these revelations. See Stanley II, 753 
F.3d at 124; Granick & Sprigman, supra. 
 78 See infra notes 82–111 and accompanying text. 
 79 See infra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 99–111 and accompanying text. 
 82 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005) (stating that, in Kyllo, the fact that the 
thermal sensor was able to detect lawful and unlawful activity was central to the Court’s holding 
that use of the device required a warrant); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that the use of sense-
enhancing devices requires a warrant when the device can detect activity within the home that 
could not otherwise be obtained without entry into the home); Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119–20 (rec-
ognizing that Moocherhunter meets the requirements of the Kyllo test but refusing to apply the test 
in Stanley because defendant sent information outside of his home). 
 83 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119–20 (holding that Stanley did not try to confine his activities 
to his home but deliberately reached outside of his home by transmitting child pornography 
through his neighbor’s wireless router). 
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observation outside of the home.84 Because the Supreme Court in Kyllo held 
this type of search to be unconstitutional, use of the Moocherhunter to detect 
Stanley’s activity within his home was also unconstitutional.85  
Furthermore, the Third Circuit misapplied Kyllo by not addressing a sig-
nificant aspect of that decision: the distinction between lawful and unlawful 
activity.86 Like the thermal sensor in Kyllo, Moocherhunter software is able to 
detect both lawful and unlawful activity.87 Law enforcement in Kyllo were 
only interested in using a thermal sensor to detect illegal activity, yet the fact 
that the device was capable of detecting legal activity rendered use of the de-
vice without a warrant a Fourth Amendment violation.88 By ignoring the Su-
preme Court’s reasoning in Kyllo, the Third Circuit omitted essential prece-
dent.89  
After refusing to recognize Moocherhunter as a sense-enhancing device 
that requires a warrant, the Third Circuit applied the expectation of privacy 
test to hold that Stanley lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy.90 In Kyllo, 
the Supreme Court refused to consider whether or not the defendant’s expec-
tation of privacy in growing marijuana in his home was reasonable.91 There, 
the Court held that an expectation of privacy for activities taking place within 
the home is inherently reasonable because protection of the home is the “very 
core” of the Fourth Amendment.92 The Third Circuit once again failed to ap-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that use of a device to obtain information about the interior of a 
home that, absent the device, could not be obtained without entering the home is a Fourth Amend-
ment violation). In Kyllo, the majority rejected the dissent’s argument that details about the home 
that are transmitted outside of the home, or “off the wall,” should not be protected. See id. at 35; 
id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that by emitting heat waves outside of the home, defendant 
had exposed information to the public that was not protected by the Fourth Amendment).  
 85 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119–20. 
 86 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10 (stating that the Kyllo decision protects against devices 
that detect lawful and unlawful activity); Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 119–20. 
 87 See United States v. Stanley (Stanley I), No. 11–272, 2012 WL 5512987, at *6 (W.D. Pa. 
Nov. 14, 2012), aff’d, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014). In Stanley, law enforcement used Mooch-
erhunter in “passive mode” to track Stanley to his home. See id. But Moocherhunter can also be used 
in “active mode” to track any wireless signal being transmitted to any router, not just the signals 
being sent to a specific router. Id. The Third Circuit compared the use of Moocherhunter to the use 
of a drug-sniffing dog, stating that a warrant is not required to use a drug-sniffing dog because the 
dog is trained to detect only unlawful activity. See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 121–22 (citing Caballes, 
543 U.S. at 410). Yet this comparison is incorrect because Moocherhunter is capable of detecting 
both lawful and unlawful activity, making it the type of device the Kyllo court sought to provide 
protection against. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10. 
 88 See 533 U.S. at 37–38, 40. 
 89 See id.; Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120–22. 
 90 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120–22. 
 91 See 533 U.S. at 34 (noting that for questions regarding searches within the home, there is a 
minimum expectation of privacy that exists and is per se reasonable). 
 92 See id. at 31, 34 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). In Kyllo, the 
Supreme Court held that “to withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit 
police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.” See id. at 34; Sil-
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ply precedent from Kyllo when the court applied the expectation of privacy 
test to the facts in Stanley.93 
As a broader issue, the Third Circuit’s application of the expectation of 
privacy test to wireless Internet traffic illustrates the need to abandon the use 
of the expectation of privacy test in the Internet context.94 In practice, the test 
reflects the reasonable expectations of judges, rather than the practices of the 
average Internet user.95 Internet use has become so routinized that most users 
do not consider the privacy implications of their online activity.96 The Third 
Circuit’s holding showcases the disconnect between judge-made standards 
and the expectations of the average Internet user.97 This application of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test threatens the practices of law-abiding 
Internet users in order to avoid green-lighting a practice that may enable 
criminals to escape detection.98 
                                                                                                                           
verman, 365 U.S. at 511 (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man 
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”). 
 93 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120–22. 
 94 See id.; Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Tech-
nology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 8–9 (2002) (arguing that the expectation of 
privacy test has diminished, rather than protected, individual privacy); Brandon T. Crowther, 
(Un)reasonable Expectation of Digital Privacy, 2012 BYU L. REV. 343, 344 (arguing that the test 
cannot protect privacy interests when applied to the digital realm). 
 95 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[J]udges are 
apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person 
to which the Katz test looks.”); Cloud, supra note 94, at 28 (noting that reasonable expectations 
reflect the subjective views of judges); Crowther, supra note 94, at 356 (arguing that younger 
generations master technology before more senior judges are able to understand that same tech-
nology); Shindelman, supra note 3, at 1934–35 (stating that society’s expectations of privacy 
change as technology changes). 
 96 See Tokson, supra note 65, at 628 (arguing that Internet users consider their online activity to 
be private despite the reality that ISPs and others can track and divulge their online activities). The 
recent NSA leaks, as well as recent revelations regarding commercial uses of individual online activi-
ty, have made U.S. citizens more aware of personal privacy risks. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Col-
lecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THEGUARDIAN.COM, Jun. 5, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2YRF-WVGU; Jack Schofield, Can I Get Sites Like Facebook and Google to Re-
move All My Personal Data?, THEGUARDIAN.COM, Aug. 14, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/askjack/2014/aug/14/can-i-get-sites-like-facebook-and-
google-to-remove-all-my-personal-data, archived at http://perma.cc/AB57-V56N (discussing the 
difficulty in deleting personal tracking data that is collected and stored by websites). As Justice Mar-
shall suggested of the telephone, the Internet has become a necessity that individuals cannot avoid 
using even if they suspect that others may be able to track their activity and location. See Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 97 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring); Cloud, supra note 94, at 28; Crowther, 
supra note 94, at 356; Shindelman, supra note 3, at 1934–35. 
 98 See Benjamin D. Kern, Whacking, Joyriding and War-Driving: Roaming Use of Wi-Fi and 
the Law, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 115 (2004) (arguing that the crim-
inal acts of some should not result in legal restrictions on open wireless networks); Wells, supra 
note 1, at 126 (“While fighting crime is important, it is not so important that the law should cease 
to develop concomitant to society.”). 
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Finally, given the uncertainty regarding the legality of the use of unpro-
tected wireless routers, Congress should step in and provide legislative clari-
ty.99 The Third Circuit’s analysis requires an assumption that Stanley’s use of 
an unprotected wireless router was, in fact, illegal.100 The court described 
Stanley’s unauthorized use of a neighbor’s wireless router as an activity that 
is of “dubious legality” without identifying a statute that clearly prohibited 
such conduct.101 Like many users, Stanley chose an open wireless network 
from a menu of available networks, some of which were likely password-
protected, while others, like his neighbor’s, were left open.102 Wireless net-
works are often made available for others to use freely.103 In fact, the growing 
Open Wireless Movement encourages wireless router owners to keep their 
Internet connection open to others.104 What the Third Circuit views as “likely 
illegal” is viewed by many as an everyday activity that provides the ability to 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See generally Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that legislative action 
is needed when new technology threatens privacy interests). 
 100 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 121; Bierlein, supra note 1, at 1125–26 (noting ambiguity as to 
whether or not state and federal laws apply to the use of open wireless networks); Kern, supra 
note 98, at 119–56 (2004) (providing a full discussion of the ambiguity of federal and state stat-
utes as applied to accessing open wireless networks). 
 101 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 120–21 nn.10–11. Pennsylvania statutes do not define “unau-
thorized access,” and therefore, accessing an open wireless router is not clearly covered by the 
statutes. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3926, 7611 (2014); Bierlein, supra note 1, at 1125–26; Kern, 
supra note 98, at 161. 
 102 See Bierlein, supra note 1, at 1131 (noting that wireless router owners often do not pass-
word-protect their routers, sometimes with the express intent of sharing their Internet access freely 
with others); Kern, supra note 98, at 161 (noting that it is easier for the owner of a wireless router 
to password-protect their router than for a user to intuit whether or not the owner wants to share 
their access or has merely been remiss in setting a password); Ned Snow, Accessing the Internet 
Through the Neighbor’s Wireless Internet Connection: Physical Trespass in Virtual Reality, 84 
NEB. L. REV. 1226, 1229 (2006) (arguing that when an individual does not set a password on their 
router they are implying consent for others to use their router). 
 103 See Response Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that Stanley used his 
neighbor’s router because it was free); Bierlein, supra note 1, at 1131; Snow, supra note 102, at 
1229; Dennis O’Reilly, How to Find Truly Free Wireless Access, CNET (Mar. 27, 2013, 10:39 AM), 
http://www.cnet.com/how-to/how-to-find-truly-free-wireless-access/, archived at http://perma.cc/
46FS-HHHU (identifying different ways to locate and use free wireless Internet access). 
 104 See OPEN WIRELESS MOVEMENT, https://openwireless.org/, archived at https://perma.cc/
JBJ4-BFWS (last visited May 1, 2015) (“The Open Wireless Movement is a coalition of Internet 
freedom advocates, companies, organizations, and technologists working to develop new wireless 
technologies and to inspire a movement of Internet openness.”); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 14 (2001) (arguing 
that, as a free resource, the Internet promotes innovation); Bierlein, supra note 1, at 1126 (assert-
ing that the law should allow individuals to share their Internet access in order to support the net-
work effects of Internet use); Kern, supra note 98, at 108 (maintaining that shared wireless access 
promotes collaboration and the sharing of ideas). 
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communicate and conduct business and personal transactions from any loca-
tion.105 
The needs of law enforcement and the interests of Internet Service Pro-
viders (“ISPs”) add another level of complexity to the mix.106 Law enforce-
ment must be able to apprehend criminals, like Stanley, who use the Internet 
to commit crimes.107 When criminals use open wireless networks to conduct 
criminal activity, however, law enforcement faces a potentially impenetrable 
barrier to apprehension.108 ISPs also have an interest in protecting their com-
modity, Internet access.109 This interest is under attack by those who, like the 
Open Wireless Movement, believe that Internet access should be freely acces-
sible to everyone.110 Given the number of stakeholders and the diversity of 
opinions regarding open wireless Internet access, this is an area that is best 
regulated by the legislature rather than courts.111 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Bierlein, supra note 1, at 1185 (stating that the Internet has transformed the way peo-
ple engage in daily life). Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967 in Katz v. United States rec-
ognized the “vital role” the telephone had come to play in people’s lives and chose to provide 
protection for that essential technology. See 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). It is estimated that by 2012 
there were 160 million wireless Internet users in the United States, accounting for roughly half of 
the population. See COMPUTER INDUSTRY ALMANAC INC. & FORECASTS, INTERNET USER FORE-
CAST BY COUNTRY 9 (Apr. 2012); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, State & 
County QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
W8NB-F4NT (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 106 See Bierlein, supra note 1, at 1176 (listing various stakeholders in the wireless networking 
space); David Gray et. al., Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 745, 800 (2013) (arguing that privacy interests must be balanced with the needs of 
law enforcement); Kerr, supra note 1, at 543 (recognizing the need to balance the protection of an 
individual’s civil liberties with the needs of law enforcement). 
 107 See United States v. Broadhurst, No. 3:11–cr–00121–MO–1, 2012 WL 5985615, at *5 (D. 
Or. Nov. 28, 2012) (noting the potential inconsistency of refusing to allow tracking of open wire-
less network users while allowing tracking of individuals who use their own personal wireless 
network); Kerr, supra note 1, at 526 (noting the need to empower law enforcement to apprehend 
criminals). 
 108 See Stanley II, 753 F.3d at 121 (stating that had Stanley accessed the Internet using his 
own wireless network law enforcement could have apprehended him); Broadhurst, 2012 WL 
5985615, at *5; Wells, supra note 1, at 107 (noting that law enforcement must have the technolog-
ical tools to keep up with cybercrime). 
 109 See Kern, supra note 98, at 110 (noting that some ISPs try to protect their commodity by 
adding usage restrictions in Terms of Use policies). 
 110 See id. at 111 (arguing that, despite the prohibitions of some ISPs, lost revenue from 
shared wireless Internet access is not sufficient to prohibit the activity); OPEN WIRELESS MOVE-
MENT, supra note 104. See generally LESSIG, supra note 104, at 14 (arguing that all aspects of the 
Internet, from architecture to access, must remain freely accessible to all). 
 111 See Bierlein, supra note 1, at 1177 (noting that wireless networking policies must balance 
the needs of stakeholders); Solove, supra note 77, at 1515 (arguing that courts should review 
technology regulations set by the legislature instead of creating their own). 
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CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Stanley, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit misapplied U.S. Supreme Court precedent to reach its holding. The Third 
Circuit applied the expectation of privacy test from Katz v. United States to 
hold that police did not need a warrant to use Internet tracking software to 
locate Stanley within his home. Yet under Kyllo v. United States, the expecta-
tion of privacy test is not applicable when devices are used to identify activity 
within the home if that activity could not otherwise be observed without en-
tering the home. Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied Stanley’s petition 
for writ of certiorari, the widespread use of open wireless networks will con-
tinue to implicate these privacy concerns. In the future, the U.S. Supreme 
Court should ensure that a warrant is required to use devices capable of de-
tecting wireless Internet activity within the home. 
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